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What Happened to “Greater China”?: 
Changing Geopolitics in the 
China Triangle
Allen Chun
I. Introduction
Although I am an anthropologist working in Taiwan, doing 
research most recently in relation to contemporary Taiwan, I actu-
ally started out my career more interested in Southeast Asia, focus-
ing initially on problems of a more historical or sociological nature. 
In the study of Southeast Asia, it is difficult to ignore the presence of 
the Chinese, who make up a large and significant proportion of the 
population, especially in Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines, not 
to mention nations on its geographical periphery, such as Vietnam, 
Thailand and Burma. Relations with the Chinese go back centuries, 
first with generations of traders, then followed in the 19th century by 
mass emigration of laborers from southeastern China. In dealing with 
the diverse disposition of Chinese everywhere else, the obvious ques-
tions can be posed: How does one reconcile the nature of cultural con-
tinuities or discontinuities? Do these diversities reflect back on cultural 
questions of a more fundamental or seminal nature? That is what other 
scholars usually ask, but I am admittedly not very interested in such 
questions, even as an anthropologist. What I find more interesting in 
such experiences is that it is quite difficult to ignore the regional or 
global context of any culture or society, even China per se.
All local cultures and societies live in constant interaction with 
larger geopolitical forces, and how we understand that context is para-
mount. In past decades, Western scholars have looked at China and 
East Asia in general from a variety of regional or global lenses. Such 
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societies, especially in the postwar era, have been the focus of what 
William A. Callahan has called “social science fantasies.”1 The rise 
of “miracle economies” in East Asia—first Japan, then Taiwan, South 
Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore—gave birth to the term “Four Little 
Dragons.” Since this rise corresponded closely with the “stagflation” of 
Western capitalism in the 1970s, many scholars singled out culture as 
a possible determining factor in this unique development. Sociologist 
Peter Berger coined the notion of economic culture.2 In a book entitled 
In Search of an East Asian Development Model, he noted the “comparative 
advantage of Sinic civilization,”3 but the first to underscore the role of 
Asian values in the rise of East Asia was political scientist Roderick 
MacFarquhar in an essay in The Economist entitled “The Post-Confu-
cian Challenge.”4 Models of East Asian capitalism filled the scholarly 
literature in the 1980s but shifted in the 1990s to focus more on over-
seas Chinese capitalism, which corresponded on the one hand with 
the bursting of the Japanese economic bubble and on the other hand 
with the rise of transnational Chinese capitalists throughout East and 
Southeast Asia. At the same time, scholars began to compare Japanese 
models of capitalism with Chinese ones, but all of these discussions 
hinted at distinctive features, i.e., unique ideologies, institutions, and 
practices, that were supposed to drive these discrete economies.
As variations on the theme of a so-called Sinic mode of production, 
there are diverse tendencies as well. Gordon Redding has taken Berg-
er’s notion of economic culture most seriously, by attempting to show 
how distinctive ideologies or institutions can be elucidated to shed 
light on Chinese business organizations and practices everywhere.5 
Sociologist Gary Hamilton, on the other hand, while recognizing the 
relevance of cultural influences on Chinese economic organization, 
argues against relying on a “sociocentric” model, noting that “Chinese 
capitalism cannot be understood apart from the dynamics of the global 
economy, because…Chinese capitalism is not a domestic capitalism 
(i.e., the product of indigenous economic growth) but rather is integral 
to world capitalism itself.”6 Another sociologist, Ezra Vogel, tends to 
see a balanced role between culture and sociopolitical context, which 
can be used to contrast the industrializing experiences of Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore,7 while anthropologists Aihwa 
Ong and Don Nonini, looking from the vantage point of Southeast 
Asia, view the success of Chinese capitalists largely as an extension of 
inherently transnational tendencies and skills.8 Finally, there are many 
scholars who take seriously the role of Confucianism in the develop-
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ment of capitalism, either in Weberian or other terms. In the 1980s, 
even the Singapore government actively explored the applicability of 
Weber’s Protestant ethic to Confucianism, which helped to promote 
the primacy of Asian values in cultural policy, in the form of religion, 
as a prime mover in economic development.
In raising these examples, I am not particularly interested in pur-
suing any of these complex themes, any of which can easily be the 
subject of separate books. My point is to show, by way of background 
discussion, that the way in which scholars look at China is often the 
product of inherently larger concerns. The debate regarding East Asian 
capitalism is equally reflective of a deeper debate about the nature of 
capitalistic development as it is inflective of the way scholars generally 
perceive the role of culture in constituting society or driving institu-
tional life practices. In the final analysis, they are not end points in 
themselves but are intended to have ramifications that disguise the 
way that we contrast the relative economic and political potentiali-
ties of East versus West (or what political theorist Samuel Huntington 
ominously calls “the clash of civilizations”9), while serving as foci for 
extending academic debates over the nature of capitalism or revital-
izing Confucianism.
II. Greater China
The notion of Greater China is a product of rather different concerns 
and circumstances. But since I already mentioned the ominous words 
of Samuel Huntington, one might be interested to know that he also 
has a position on Greater China. He has argued that, through what he 
calls “Greater China and its Co-Prosperity Sphere,” “China is resuming 
its place as regional hegemon, and the East is coming into its own.”10 
I cite Huntington’s comment here simply to dismiss it summarily, as 
it really reflects an extremist version of Yellow Peril Orientalism that 
was promoted avidly by Cold War era polemicists and now by their 
successors in the CIA and Pentagon. On the other hand, Greater China, 
as I understand the term, was initially coined in the 1980s and became 
popular in the 1990s to represent what seemed to be a newly emerging 
phenomenon at that time. A major scholarly journal on contemporary 
Chinese affairs, The China Quarterly, devoted a special issue to this in 
1993. As its editor, David Shambaugh, neatly put it, “Greater China 
is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon which exists even if the 
term to describe it is not entirely apt.”11 In effect, the phenomenon 
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that Shambaugh alludes to here refers not just to the face of a newly 
emerging China, as though it is the product largely of its own internal 
political struggles and social transformations. I would also say that 
this newly emerging phenomenon took on distinctive meaning in the 
context of subtle unconscious changes taking place within the modern 
world system, during which one can see a renewed importance in the 
particularistic role of cultural forces and relationships. I deliberately 
phrase my description of the phenomenon in this way because it is 
crucial to explain what was really old or new about it; secondly, why 
we tend to see the inherent influence of cultural factors; and thirdly, 
what happened when use of the term Greater China began to fade into 
obscurity toward the end of the millennium.
First, the phenomenon itself: it is generally recognized that, in the 
1980s, one began to see growing interactions and interdependencies 
between China and its neighbors, Hong Kong and Taiwan initially, 
then broadly expanding outward in Asia through links with other 
ethnic Chinese. China watcher par excellence Harry Harding notes that 
the first references to the notion of Greater China most likely occurred 
in journalistic articles in Taiwan and Hong Kong that foresaw and 
advocated the emergence of a “Chinese common market” that would 
link Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao, Singapore, and PRC, using terms like 
zhongguoren gongtongti (Chinese communal entity) and zhongguoren 
jingji jituan (Chinese economic corporation).12 I emphasize the advent 
of the phenomenon as described above and our initial attempts to 
characterize it as a term rather than the appearance of the term itself, 
because I do not think that the term for Greater China, at least in Chi-
nese (da zhonghua), ever became a popular or useful term in Chinese 
intellectual circles, unlike in the West. One can debate the hypotheti-
cal question of whether Greater China is actually an Orientalism, but 
the phenomenon itself is very real. As cursory attempts to phrase it 
suggest, the phenomenon began in earnest with the increase of eco-
nomic flows and relations between China and its neighbors. These 
economic bonds developed into a broader community that enveloped 
common cultural interests and political sentiments. In other words, it 
became more than an E.U.- or NAFTA-like common market. Its multi-
dimensionality also raises obvious questions about its ramifications for 
other domains of life, society and polity. At the same time, while one 
can recognize that this is a complex economic, cultural, and political 
phenomenon, on the other hand our attempts to understand it func-
tionally have invoked debate and confusion about the concepts and 
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interpretations used to define the term. In other words, are we really 
looking at interaction, integration, or reunification? This confusion in 
conceptualization at a functional level underlies the controversy over 
Greater China as a problematic idea, much more than the understand-
ing of what constitutes “Greater” and why. In geographical terms, the 
nucleus of Greater China has been unambiguously Hong Kong and 
Taiwan, but how far one can extend it elsewhere in Asia through the 
network of Chinese is a matter of definition.
Nonetheless, the phenomenon of Greater China emerged clearly in 
the 1980s and into the 1990s, followed by a growing awareness and 
attention to it in intellectual circles in the 1990s. In economic terms, 
we see in this period of expansion greater flows of capital between 
the three places that constitute what I prefer to call the “China Tri-
angle,” and the nature of these flows is very uneven. In the post-WWII 
era, Hong Kong had always been heavily engaged in and dependent 
on trade with PRC for goods of all kinds, principally for subsistence 
items, while serving as an entrepôt for China trade going to and from 
the rest of the world. Active investment by Hong Kong entrepreneurs 
in China was made possible in the post-Maoist era by the change in 
policies initiated by Deng Xiaoping. This coincided symbolically with 
the Sino-British agreement in 1984 to return Hong Kong to Chinese 
sovereignty in the sense that it ironically signaled the opening up of 
capitalism in China and Hong Kong’s role in it. This change in policy 
not only opened the floodgates of capital but also opened up flows of 
people between China and Hong Kong. Most of the movement was 
unidirectional; special economic zones in Shenzhen (bordering Hong 
Kong) then elsewhere acted as magnets to attract Hong Kong invest-
ment, which in later years spread everywhere in China. The outflow of 
capital from Hong Kong to China has continued unabated to the pres-
ent to the point where Hong Kong manufacturers today employ more 
workers in south China than in Hong Kong itself.
The case of Taiwan is slightly different. In 1981, the PRC’s no-tariff 
policy for Taiwanese imports, followed by the creation of a special 
economic zone in Fujian, served as initial incentives to attract Taiwan-
ese investment. The flow of Taiwanese goods and capital into China 
was mostly unidirectional, too, in the sense that the KMT government 
in Taiwan was slow to open up its Cold War embargo against PRC 
goods until much later. As in the case of Hong Kong, the opening up 
of economic trade on both sides eventually increased the flow to a 
point today at which it is constantly growing. On the economic face 
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of things, Greater China is supposed to be getting greater and greater. 
More interaction should bring about more dependence, but does this 
bring about more integration, and is more integration the backdrop 
for eventual reunification (as though to suggest that this is really what 
PRC had in mind when it first coined such meaningful terms as “social-
ism with Chinese characteristics” and “one country, two systems”)? 
The interface where phenomenon meets concept is unfortunately also 
the interface where fact meets (discursive) fiction. At the outset, I delib-
erately set aside this problematique, because this is where the confusion 
starts, and this is where the phenomenon starts to get complicated, 
beyond anyone’s imagination. If we stay only at the descriptive level of 
phenomenal change, Greater China has never stopped getting greater, 
but this already contradicts our later discovery that the concept has 
most recently faded away.
In the cultural terms of the 1980s, the phenomenon of a Greater 
China really refers to the emerging popularity of Hong Kong and Tai-
wanese pop culture, despite official disdain by the CCP. Canto-pop and 
Mando-pop have diverse, complex origins in Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
One should not assume ipso facto that they are merely indigenous cre-
ations of an ongoing folk culture. In an earlier essay, I argued that pop-
ular culture in both places is, in fact, a unique consequence of changing 
geopolitical forces.13 The advent in the 1970s and 1980s of what we 
recognize today as Hong Kong and Taiwanese pop culture was made 
possible by overt depoliticization of the cultural domain. Mass medi-
ated culture emerged against the current of more dominant forces, like 
Mandarin and Cantonese cultural spheres as well as Western ones. 
Despite its actual origins, the cultural face presented by the PRC took 
on a different tone. Pop culture was not just the influx of modernity; its 
politically subversive nature made its channels (including back-door 
ones) even more informal than the economic ones. Needless to say, the 
cultural flows that defined Greater China in this regard were almost 
exclusively unidirectional. Thomas Gold was correct to term Greater 
China culture gangtai (literally, Hong Kong-Taiwanese).14 Perhaps even 
more than Greater China’s economy, the cultural affinities were quite 
explicit. The fact that it was a Chinese language medium culture made 
the cultural content of this Greater China unabashedly modern, if not 
openly Western. Reverse cultural flow from PRC back to Hong Kong 
and Taiwan did not occur until much later, and this was obviously a 
consequence of the emergence of pop culture in China precipitated in 
part by gangtai culture. One can ruminate on cultural developments, 
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which, as in the case of the economy, might inevitably invoke ques-
tions of presumed integration, synthesis, and resistance. Yet it is clear 
that economy and culture do not seem to work in exactly the same way 
and, thus, should have different implications for a Greater China.
An interesting spin off from the cultural dimension of Greater China 
described above is the idea of cultural China invoked by Tu Weiming. 
In a special issue of Daedalus, Tu remarks that the term cultural China 
originated in Chinese intellectual circles and that in his usage it refers 
to two communities of people: (1) ethnic Chinese who inhabit Greater 
China and abroad, and (2) concerned individuals (including non-Chi-
nese intellectuals) interested in the fate of China.15 Although his use of 
cultural China was not meant to coincide with Greater China, it was 
motivated by the same perceptions that saw a greater community of 
mind that transcended China per se and by values that advocated a 
renaissance from the outside that could serve as a paradigmatic model 
for “a declining core.” As a neo-Confucian intellectual historian, he 
is obviously not referring to pop culture as the great synthesizer but 
some other cosmology that could, in theory, unite Chinese and Sino-
philes everywhere and whose center of gravity is perhaps closer to 
Cambridge, Massachusetts (i.e., in the global center).
The third dimension of Greater China, the political, is perhaps the 
most questionable. If one reads the literature, one gets a sense that the 
political is implicitly intertwined with other dimensions of Greater 
China. In overt terms, Greater China is not about political relations 
binding PRC, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Instead, it is a communal entity 
built on informal, extra-political, or transnational ties relying on con-
crete economic and cultural bonds that seem to have political ramifi-
cations. The diverse politicized literature is really a function of how 
various people read the significance of its economic and cultural rela-
tions. Even the astute Harry Harding makes the following conclusion 
in his analysis of Greater China: “the re-creation of a global Chinese 
culture has been a natural process: the product of a common ancestry, 
facilitated by modern communications.”16 The institutional develop-
ments in relation to a more universalistic Chinese culture suggests 
increased communications brought about by the withering away of 
physical and bureaucratic obstacles, while the linguistic and cultural 
affinities between people can exploit common values in tradition or 
interests in modernity to create such a global village. More impor-
tantly, this cultural sphere of Greater China seems to have only posi-
tive effects that might facilitate any eventual reunification. In the realm 
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of economy, Harding argues that the emergence of a transnational Chi-
nese economy is not just about the embrace of capitalism as a motor for 
raising its own standards of living and that its political machinations in 
Greater China are played differently by all sides of the China straits:
From Beijing’s perspective, economic interaction is viewed as a way of 
facilitating the eventual political reunification of China. The mainland 
Chinese government has therefore adopted a series of policies to stimu-
late commercial relations with Hong Kong and Taiwan, most notably the 
creation of special economic zones directly opposite them, for political 
as well as for purely commercial reasons. Hong Kong, in turn, regards 
economic ties with the mainland as a way of cushioning its return to 
Chinese sovereignty in 1997, in that they will give Beijing a large and 
direct stake in preserving the territory’s political viability and economic 
prosperity throughout the transition. On Taiwan, in contrast, economic 
interaction with the mainland is seen in the short term as a lever for 
extracting political concessions from Beijing, especially with regard to 
renouncing the use of force against the island and allowing Taiwan a 
larger voice in international affairs, and possibly a way of promoting 
democratization.17
I think the complicated relationships that Harding spells out reflect 
less the complex nature of the phenomenon than the complicated 
nature of his thinking. More importantly, it is not possible to divorce 
his logic from his politicized reading of real or imagined intents of 
policy strategy on different sides of the divide. I do not deny that there 
is politics in the way policies are practiced on all sides of this battle; I 
spell them out merely to suggest that there are other kinds of politics at 
work here, too (i.e., a more abstract kind of geopolitics).
At this point, it might be useful just to underscore and problema-
tize certain aspects of Greater China. First of all, it is without doubt a 
transnational phenomenon, but I would argue that this is the product 
of changes in both the local and global environments. To be sure, none 
of this would have been possible without the post-Maoist transition in 
PRC that not only gave rise to capitalism but also actively engaged in 
interaction with the rest of the world. This change of policy garnered 
the active support of Hong Kong’s rich capitalists who ended up being 
the biggest promoters of reunification with the motherland and toeing 
the official line to suppress democracy. However, in its overt trans-
nationalism, scholars tend to neglect the fact that the border-crossing 
nature of Chinese capital and people has been no different from the 
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transnational transformations of Western capitalism seen elsewhere. 
That is to say, in the demise of the Cold War and imperial politics, the 
opening up of the market in China has generally followed the path of 
what Lash and Urry aptly call “disorganized capitalism.”18 The flows 
were not literally random or chaotic, but the implicit decentralization 
effectively broke down standard notions of political, economic, and 
cultural affiliation, and this is what Greater China has symbolized. 
Secondly, despite the cultural façade of Greater China, I argue that 
the unifying effect of a common culture is highly exaggerated and 
plays at best a secondary role. I doubt if a common pop culture would 
unify anything political (Tu’s Confucianism actually stands a better 
chance), and the nepotistic ties that bind the Chinese entrepreneur 
to his ethnic homeland are equally exaggerated. Chinese business-
men—especially those Chinese traders who dominated commerce for 
300 years in Southeast Asia—had always been, according to Wang 
Gungwu, penultimate multiculturalists.19 Successful survival required 
adaptability to local conditions, including assimilation, if necessary. 
The first principle of any entrepreneur, even in multinational corpora-
tions, is usually to exploit the markets that are most familiar. In this 
regard, the rapid expansion of overseas Chinese interests into Greater 
China was simply a natural reaction prompted by the dismantling of 
political or bureaucratic barriers. Thirdly, an obvious feature of Greater 
China that ultimately proved to be more salient than culture itself was 
its center of gravity. Whether it was economic, cultural, or political, its 
critical mass was always centered outside China, if not in Hong Kong 
then somewhere within the Triangle.
To sum it up in a sentence, whatever made Greater China what it 
is—its driving force, however defined—was essentially located outside 
PRC. More importantly, the thing that created this gravitas was not any 
one factor, although scholars usually underline the economy. It is more 
precisely the unique confluence of both local and global forces; on the 
one hand, the ideological or political forces transforming PRC society 
and polity as a whole and, on the other hand, the changing face of 
transnational capitalism, which in many senses has subtly accommo-
dated the fluid nature of transborder flows and nurtured the informal 
economy and hybridized identities that continue to thrive and mutate 
in PRC, expanding back outward.
If this confluence is what I call geopolitics, then I should point out 
that geopolitics, too can always change. In fact, it is undergoing basic 
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transformation, and this change is perhaps reflected most aptly in the 
recent demise of Greater China in the emergence of other things.
III. Post-1997 Hong Kong
At this point, I would like to shift the substance of my discussion to 
something explicitly different, namely, post-1997 Hong Kong. There 
are many ways of talking about Greater China as an ongoing regional 
entity per se, but nothing captures this fundamental change in abstract 
geopolitical disposition better than the kinds of changes that have per-
meated Hong Kong in the last decade. Ironically, every time I return 
to Hong Kong, I am surprised at how little things have changed, that 
is, on the surface of things. But these are really just illusions. In fact, I 
would go so far as to say that much of what is now portrayed as the 
standard history of Hong Kong is fiction or, in other words, a subtle, 
elaborate rewriting of the original facts. The historical irony of Hong 
Kong’s official handover to China on July 1, 1997 (or “return to the 
motherland,” depending on one’s point of view) was that the future of 
Hong Kong, which had been ceded in perpetuity, was made to coincide 
with the end of the 99-year lease of the New Territories, a land mass 
several times larger than Hong Kong island and Kowloon put together. 
Few people remember now that the New Territories was supposed to 
be administered as an extension of Hong Kong, with due respect to 
native (presumably unchanging) tradition, even though the reality of 
modern expansion later effectively incorporated it into the larger colo-
nial history of Hong Kong. On the other hand, the Chinese government 
continued to play along with the official reality of the lease, denying all 
the while the validity of Hong Kong’s status as a ceded colony (being 
the result of a treaty signed under duress). Handover Day became a 
Chinese national holiday, and the coincidence of Hong Kong’s celebra-
tion of the Queen’s birthday on the eve of the handover then canonized 
the five-day weekend into an event of unreal proportions many times 
over. The reality of Hong Kong’s colonial existence, no doubt already 
mystified by its official “disappearance,” was suddenly resurrected 
by the fiction of a lease that had already been meaningless, if not long 
dead. Convenient rewriting of the facts is not trivial but instead a 
staple feature of Hong Kong history. In the same vein, one can ques-
tion whether the guarantee of a capitalist status quo in post-1997 Hong 
Kong really means that nothing has changed. Contrary to expectation, 
appearances are deceiving.
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Even though the inevitability of repatriation made the transitional 
period leading up to 1997 ripe for a resurrection of anti-colonialist 
fervor, a renaissance in nationalist sentiment, and the promotion of 
self-censorship as a precursor for Sinicization PRC style, very few of 
these developments continued into the new era. The People’s Libera-
tion Army, under the intense scrutiny of the media, entered Hong 
Kong, but little else materialized to signal the advent of military or 
Party domination. Despite the fears of political oppression that initially 
prompted the media to adopt self-censorship, the relative freedom of 
the press in airing critical views of official government policy after the 
establishment of the S.A.R. regime ran counter to the trends prompted 
by heightened nationalism, which was supposed to be the point of 
departure for all other institutional changes. One can speculate as to 
why so little has changed on the socio-political face of things, espe-
cially in light of various indicators to the contrary. The Chinese govern-
ment made several official proclamations in order to counter fears of 
an anticipated suppression of press freedom. It indicated that it would 
adopt a position of noninterference in local affairs, but that was only 
a partial reality that disguised the changing nature of Hong Kong’s 
“public” sphere. The fiction contributing to the notion that Hong Kong 
was an autonomous “region” was reflective, to some extent, of the 
PRC’s position that (at least in some functional respects) Hong Kong 
could be regarded as separate from China. Economically, China was 
integrally linked to the global economy through Hong Kong, and the 
1998 Asian recession had demonstrated that Hong Kong still played a 
major role. In social and local political matters, Hong Kong’s autonomy 
impacted relatively less on developments on the Chinese mainland. As 
long as the political scheme of things insured the appointment of Bei-
jing-sympathetic cliques to power, media opposition was a matter for 
local government to handle and did not directly impact upon Beijing.
Yet curiously enough, in practice, freedom of the press was restricted 
only to local affairs. As Frank Ching noted, the Hong Kong media tread 
more cautiously in news pertaining to China, or, to be more precise, 
news and information that required the cooperation of Chinese agen-
cies and China-backed companies.20 Some other topics were too sen-
sitive or were totally taboo, such as the activities of official agencies 
that fronted for the Communist Party. As Michael Curtin observed, 
the boundaries of media openness were a function of the fact that 
the Hong Kong media was not a local entity but one whose market 
depended upon expansion into China. As he said, “this strategy of 
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expansion into the mainland market thus requires the cooperation of 
government officials, if the industry is going to reap the benefits of its 
popularity.”21 Thus, the principle of media freedom was compromised 
in order to satisfy the reality of market access and control. This in turn 
reinforced the perceived necessity of self-censorship. In theory, autono-
mous, but in practice…
Following up on the assumption of autonomy, most of the media 
attention has turned to the plight of the democratization movement. 
The inability to institute a truly democratic government in post-1997 
Hong Kong mostly has to do with the legacy of British rule. The gov-
ernor and members of the legislative council were appointed. Chris 
Patten’s attempts to introduce fully free elections in the post-1984 
transition were, contrary to rhetorical fanfare, just facetious last-ditch 
efforts by a colonial lame duck administration to frustrate the Com-
munist takeover. Moreover, few scholars emphasize the fact that the 
people who tend most to mute support for democratization are rich 
capitalists, who are guaranteed a proportional functional constituency 
in the post-1997 legislature. Maybe this is the cost (and benefit) of 
being able to do business in the PRC. In the transformation of Hong 
Kong’s public sphere, the political free rein given to bourgeois capital-
ist interests comes in effect at the expense of suppressing the autonomy 
of the public. What, then, does this say about the nature of capitalism 
in China?
In short, business interests are in fact intertwined with politics in 
ways that influence—at an underlying level—support for or the com-
promising of certain ideological principles (whether it is identity or 
democracy). This unholy alliance between business and the new regime 
was not only designed to be the foundation of the new order, its suc-
cess was dependent largely on suppressing those democratizing forces 
that represented a challenge to this power relationship. This realization 
increasingly solidified “the rules of the game.” In the final analysis, this 
complicit relation of power (or guanxi connections) is the biggest threat 
to the emergence of a truly democratic public sphere. This is the real 
face of post-1997 Hong Kong. Moreover, similar transformations have 
been taking place elsewhere, regardless of with whom the PRC does 
business. Star-TV, Yahoo, Microsoft, and Google, to name a few, have 
succumbed to “political correctness” as the price of admission into the 
China market. While this does not affect global capitalism as practiced 
elsewhere, its ramifications for Greater China, where culture and the 
economy are defined by ever increasing flows of capital and people as 
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well as expanding bonds of interdependence, cannot be understated. 
In post-1997 Hong Kong, it has already changed the underlying fabric 
of society, contrary to appearances. If that is the case, what can this say 
about Greater China itself as a powerfully emerging and systemati-
cally mutating entity?
IV. Concluding Remarks
At this point, one must first ask, does Greater China exist anymore? 
If we define the phenomenon superficially as that transnational entity 
characterized by increasing cultural and economic flows between 
extra-political Chinese-speaking societies, then Greater China should, 
if anything, be greater and greater. But this does not accord with the 
declining popularity of the concept itself. Without doubt, something 
else has changed considerably. The center of gravity has clearly shifted. 
Hong Kong and Taiwan no longer represent the foci that provide the 
driving force behind the system, as though models for “a declining 
core” in Tu Weiming’s terms. The center has definitely moved into the 
PRC itself, and the rules of the game that define the system have been 
rewritten. In the year leading up to the handover of Hong Kong in 1997, 
many debated the future of capitalism and democracy in Hong Kong 
while others debated whether Hong Kong would maintain its status 
as an important hub of capitalist development and pivotal entrepôt for 
international trade. Some argued that the PRC’s policy of continued 
support for capitalism would insure Hong Kong’s ongoing dominant 
role. Others argued that Hong Kong would eventually be overshad-
owed by the rise of Shanghai.
Shanghai’s rise to prominence as an unrivaled cosmopolitan center 
is a story in itself, but I think there is much substance to the conten-
tion that Hong Kong has already lost its role as prime mover within 
Greater China. Much of it has to do with a simple fact: the develop-
ment of capitalism in China. It is not just that capitalism is transform-
ing a traditional way of life. Capitalism itself has taken on a life of its 
own, and in rewriting the rules of the game it has increasingly sucked 
in the rest of the world. One of the things that drives the logic of this 
new capitalism can be plainly summarized in Reaganite terms: “it’s the 
market, stupid!” The way in which the centripetal pull of a limitless 
market has been wielded to make people conform to political correct-
ness should make utilitarian theory proud.
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To call its mode of operation guanxi capitalism (pejoratively, crony 
capitalism) would be overly simplistic. China is consciously aware 
that it is at the center of an expanding global market, both in terms 
of outsourced production for the world’s developed nations and the 
consumption of global products. This awareness has in turn allowed 
it to use its pivotal role to control access to desired resources or ben-
efits of the system by making people conform to the rules of the game 
in all other respects. Thus, the media has learned that it is free to 
print whatever it pleases in matters pertaining to Hong Kong (hence 
is autonomous), but that in matters involving China or cooperation 
with Chinese agencies it is forced to toe the proper ideological line as 
the price of admission. Increasingly, reporters toe the line, especially 
when they discover that the economic survival of their own enterprise 
is dependent on expansion into the China market. Similarly, Taiwanese 
businessmen, entertainers, and professionals of all sorts have learned 
to mute any expressions of sympathy for Taiwanese independence so 
as not to jeopardize their own prospects for cashing in on the lucrative 
China market, especially when it has become obvious that this market 
is much richer than their own. Most recently, PRC authorities revoked 
a tourist visa to Hong Kong for Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou for making 
politically incorrect remarks. These sanctions seem superficial, even 
frivolous at times, but they underscore that the market is in theory open, 
people are free to make money, and there is no attempt to control the 
redistribution of income (as has been the case of orthodox socialism), 
but access to the market is in practice a privilege that can be politically 
controlled, if deemed desirable or necessary. Hence, the economy’s 
new tie to political ideology; or in more familiar terms, socialism with 
Chinese characteristics.
More fundamentally, the subjective positioning behind this new 
capitalism is hardly what one would expect from a poor Third World 
nation. China is supremely confident in its ability to pull the strings 
behind the system and in the process protect its own sense of ideologi-
cal purity. The continued flow of global investment attests to their faith 
in this regard. Driving this “Sinocentrality” is a resurgent nationalistic 
fervor that has enjoyed mass support and underlies its embrace of any 
Greater China, wherever its center lies. Ultimately, the biggest fiction is 
that of “one-country, two-systems.” The ritual façade of the handover 
has marked the fictive significance of 1997. The fiction of Hong Kong’s 
autonomy in a meaningless ideological framework has reset the clock 
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on its eventual integration with China. Embrace of the motherland has 
refined institutional capitalism to new heights.
If the advent of a new kind of capitalism is the real engine that 
drives both China and Greater China at the core, at least in economic 
terms, one might then ask, “What possible ramifications does this have 
for the politics of Greater China, if not the rest of the world?” As some-
one who claims to be totally disinterested in politics, except as a peren-
nial sideline skeptic, I do not even care to speculate about what this 
might mean for Hong Kong’s eventual reintegration and the prospects 
of Taiwan’s reunification, independence, or its continued ambiguous 
status vis-à-vis China and the rest of the world. This is already a fer-
tile ground for ongoing debates among political scientists and China 
watchers everywhere. Nonetheless, one might be interested to know 
that, despite my intense disdain for Samuel Huntington’s clash of civi-
lizations theory, I happen to think that his pessimistic view of China’s 
emergence as a superpower is probably correct.
Regardless of political ramifications, Taiwan’s increasing economic 
interdependence with the mainland is already sui generis, and an irre-
versible process that may not lead necessarily to integration in an 
institutional sense but has nonetheless laid the foundation for binding 
contractual relationships at all levels, involving the complex interests 
of many parties. The situatedness of China in an expanding, if not shift-
ing, market core reiterates not only the domination of a market-driven 
logic but ultimately its vulnerability to political manipulation. One 
must ask, what is really fueling China’s drive toward economic promi-
nence? The drive in itself is something that appeared only recently. It 
did not exist during the era of Maoist socialism, and China’s global 
ambitions are in large part an extension of the nationalist identity that 
surfaced after the breakdown of Maoism and has continued to aggre-
gate.
Despite its place in a developing world, China’s current mental-
ity is reminiscent of the Great Leap Forward. One need only look at 
Shanghai’s ambitious design for its future to see that the size of the ego 
that drives them is as tall as its forthcoming skyscraper. The kind of 
mass nationalist sentiment that has buttressed these progressive devel-
opments is anything but “banal,” to mimic Michael Billig’s famous 
phrase.22 The search for national identity, which in its extreme forms of 
ritual effervescence has given way to patriotic fervor of all kinds, was 
one of the hidden agendas that emerged indirectly in the collapse of a 
Maoist ideology of class consciousness. It is also deeply rooted in the 
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cultural psyche of China’s mandate of history, which, in its more recent 
historical manifestation, is a deep-seated desire to reverse the humilia-
tion caused by a century of imperialist domination, the latter being an 
ephemeral phenomenon, relatively speaking. But that, as they say, is a 
topic for another day. •
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